- stop counting ACK and Pong frames toward the per-connection frame window;
draining a large queue used to trip the 429 limit, disconnect the client
and, after eight rounds, drop the remaining envelopes
- deliver to online recipients with try_send: a recipient that stops reading
its socket no longer pins the sender's task and memory
- throttle call wake-ups per recipient (1 per 10 s, 6 per 10 min) and
ordinary wake-ups (1 per 5 s); collapse ids for APNs and FCM
- POST /v1/register accepts X-Sepot-Identity-Proof and lets a new device take
over an existing identity (restore from the recovery phrase)
- POST /v1/keys uploads one-time prekeys and rotates signed/Kyber prekeys;
PrekeysLow is sent after AUTH when fewer than 20 remain
- GET /v1/keys hands out at most 30 one-time prekeys per address per hour
- reqwest errors are logged without the URL; UnifiedPush POSTs pin the
addresses the SSRF guard resolved; NAT64/6to4 embedded addresses are checked
- absolute AUTH deadline, at most 3 AUTH attempts, length limits on push
endpoints and VoIP tokens
- TURN credentials live 12 h and are reissued per connection every 10 min
- global attachment storage cap (SEPOT_ATTACHMENTS_TOTAL_BYTES), nosniff and
attachment disposition on downloads
- SEPOT_MAX_CONNS_PER_IP, /v1/ready backed by the database, graceful shutdown,
RLIMIT_NOFILE raised to the hard limit, server-info reports source and revision
- Dockerfile: rust 1.99, GIT_SHA build arg for the image label and
SEPOT_REVISION; Tor image on alpine 3.24
Rate limiting and the per-IP WebSocket cap trusted X-Forwarded-For and
X-Real-Ip unconditionally. Onion traffic bypasses the reverse proxy, so a
client could set the header itself and slip past every limit. Forwarded
headers are now honoured only from peers inside SEPOT_TRUSTED_PROXIES;
everyone else is keyed by peer address, and onion clients share one bucket.
The queue flush also read the whole backlog into memory at once, and the
certificate authority kept the trust-root private key in the database even
though it is only ever needed offline.
Initial public release. Anonymous on-device identity (no phone number,
e-mail, or password), Signal-protocol cryptography (X3DH + PQXDH, Double
Ratchet, sealed sender) via libsignal, a metadata-minimizing relay,
group chats, disappearing messages, encrypted local storage, optional
Tor transport, and a UI localized into Czech, English, German, Russian,
and Italian.
Monorepo: Flutter client (app/), Rust relay + wire types (rust/),
protobuf definitions (proto/), self-host deploy (deploy/).
Licensed under AGPL-3.0 with an app-store distribution exception (§7).
Julius Joska