Fixes reported by testers and found in an app review: - First message right after install no longer fails. Before the app finished registering with the relay, the outgoing message could crash on a null delivery address. The profile field is now optional and the send path throws a clear "still connecting, try again shortly" error while registration completes in the background. - The QR code and share link now appear only once the delivery address is ready. Previously a link generated before the first connection lacked routing, so the other side could not send the first message. The screen now shows a connecting state and reactively swaps in the QR when ready. - Incomplete contact links are rejected on import instead of failing at first send, with a clear prompt to ask for a fresh link. - Auto-lock no longer silences the app: after locking and unlocking, messaging is restarted (it previously stayed dead until app restart). - Group messages are marked failed on a non-per-member send error instead of hanging in the "sending" state forever. - Hardened the relay client against a rare duplicate connection when toggling Tor or locking mid-connect, and fromShareString now rejects a delivery address of the wrong length. - Pin unifiedpush below 6.2.0 to drop the webcrypto dependency (its native framework lacks LC_ENCRYPTION_INFO and blocked the iOS upload). - Skip Android release lint (network dependency check hangs on the build host and adds no value for a Flutter app).
Šepot
Šepot is an end-to-end encrypted messenger with anonymous, on-device identity. There is no phone number, e-mail, or password: an account is a keypair generated on the device, your ID is the fingerprint of your public key, and the only backup is a mnemonic phrase.
The design goal is metadata minimization with a public threat model — never "zero metadata". The relay is deliberately dumb: it cannot read message content, does not learn who sent a message, and does not log IP addresses. What it does see is documented honestly below.
Status: pre-1.0. The Android client is the primary target; iOS builds run through TestFlight. See
CHANGELOG.md.
Features
- Signal-grade cryptography via the official Rust
libsignal: X3DH + post-quantum PQXDH (Kyber-1024) key agreement, Double Ratchet, and sealed sender. - Anonymous identity — no phone/e-mail/password. Recovery through a 24-word mnemonic that encodes the identity key itself (not a KDF seed).
- Encrypted at rest — all local data lives in SQLCipher, unlocked by a PIN (Argon2id-derived key) or biometrics. Optional duress PIN opens a separate empty database.
- Group chats — up to 128 members, pairwise fan-out so every member gets full forward secrecy; the relay never learns a group exists.
- Attachments — images and files are encrypted client-side (AES-256-GCM) and uploaded as opaque blobs with a TTL; image metadata (EXIF/GPS) is stripped on send.
- Disappearing messages, read receipts (off by default), voice messages, replies, reactions, edits, contact verification (safety numbers).
- Push without Google by default — UnifiedPush/ntfy; FCM (Android) and APNs (iOS) are opt-in. A push wake-up never carries content, sender, or count.
- Tor transport (Android, via Orbot) — routes relay traffic over a
.onionto hide the client IP. Off by default. - Five languages — Czech, English, German, Russian, Italian. The UI follows the system language and can be overridden in Settings.
How it works
┌────────────┐ sealed-sender ciphertext ┌──────────────┐
│ Šepot app │ ───────(WSS or Tor)─────────▶ │ relay │ ──▶ PostgreSQL
│ (Flutter) │ ◀────── wake push ─────────── │ (Rust/axum) │ (no content,
└────────────┘ └──────────────┘ no IP, no PII)
libsignal (FFI) offline queue, TTL
SQLCipher at rest opaque attachment blobs
Every message is encrypted end-to-end with libsignal and wrapped in a sealed-sender envelope, so the relay routes by recipient delivery address without learning the sender. Undelivered messages sit in a per-recipient queue with a fixed TTL and are hard-deleted on acknowledgement.
What the relay can see: the recipient's delivery address, message size, and timing. What it cannot see: message content, the sender's identity, group membership, or (with logging disabled as shipped) client IP addresses. The full model — including where the trust boundary sits — is in THIRD-PARTY-NOTICES.md and the crypto facade app/lib/core/crypto/.
Repository layout
| Path | Contents |
|---|---|
app/ |
Flutter client (Android, iOS; desktop scaffolding present) |
rust/ |
Cargo workspace — sepot-relay (relay server), sepot-proto (prost wire types) |
proto/ |
Protobuf wire definitions — single source for both Rust and Dart |
deploy/ |
Docker Compose for self-hosting the relay (with an optional Tor onion) |
tool/ |
Helper scripts (protobuf codegen for Dart) |
Building
Client (Android)
cd app
flutter pub get
flutter build apk --release
The native libsignal binary is fetched by the Flutter native-assets hook at build time. To point a dev build at your own relay:
flutter build apk --dart-define=SEPOT_RELAY=http://<dev-relay-host>:8470
Release signing reads app/android/key.properties (kept out of the repo); without it the build falls back to the debug signing config so flutter run still works. FCM is optional — the google-services plugin is only applied if you supply your own app/android/app/google-services.json (copy google-services.json.example). Without it the app runs on UnifiedPush.
Relay (self-host)
See deploy/relay/README.md. The relay is a single Rust binary plus PostgreSQL; put a TLS-terminating reverse proxy in front of it and, optionally, expose it as a Tor onion service.
Languages
UI strings live in app/lib/l10n/app_*.arb (cs, en, de, ru, it) and are compiled by Flutter's gen-l10n. Contributions of new translations are welcome — add an app_<locale>.arb, translate the keys from app_cs.arb, and run flutter gen-l10n.
Security
Cryptography is implemented by Signal's libsignal, not by hand-rolled primitives. If you find a vulnerability, please report it privately to bezpecnost@sepot.cz rather than opening a public issue.
License
Šepot is licensed under the GNU Affero General Public License v3.0 — see LICENSE.
The license includes an AGPL §7 additional permission for app-store distribution: Šepot may be distributed through App Store / Google Play provided the complete corresponding source stays available under the AGPL through a channel without those store restrictions (this repository, F-Droid, direct APK). That permission covers only Šepot's own code. The bundled Signal libsignal is AGPL-3.0 held by Signal Messenger, LLC — its app-store status is documented in THIRD-PARTY-NOTICES.md.