5 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Julius Joska 2f6b542f24 fix(security): require a fresh PIN or biometric check for sensitive actions
An unlocked phone was enough to read the 24-word recovery phrase. The
phrase, backup export and import, the duress PIN, a longer auto-lock,
turning off screen security, enabling biometrics and deleting the
account now ask for the PIN (or biometrics with biometricOnly) every
time. The duress session never shows the phrase. PIN checks outside the
lock screen count towards the same failure throttle.
2026-10-23 10:50:16 +02:00
Julius Joska 05eeccd83b test: tag suites that need the native libsignal library 2026-10-09 15:15:34 +02:00
Julius Joska e3a2378c34 fix(app): accept incoming calls, restore from recovery phrase, duress session isolation, message loss
Calls: `call` was missing from the known content types, so every offer was
acknowledged and dropped; the call screen column now fills the width (the
avatar jumped left after hang-up); a ring started from a push ends after
12 s when no offer arrives; STUN fallback when no TURN credentials.
Registration: X-Sepot-Identity-Proof lets a new device reclaim an existing
identity; retry backs off from 30 s to 10 min and exposes a conflict flag.
Prekeys: PrekeysLow triggers a batch of 50 one-time prekeys via POST
/v1/keys; the signed prekey rotates weekly, the Kyber prekey monthly.
Messaging: crypto operations run serially (concurrent encrypts derived the
same message key); stop() waits for in-flight deliveries (auto-lock between
decrypt and persist lost messages); disappearing-message cleanup no longer
overwrites fresh messages; a push wake-up reconnects stale connections; the
outbox carries polls and mentions; length limits on wire input.
Storage: a duress session never exposes the real identity or phrase, does
not start networking and cannot touch the keystore; deleting data in a
duress session leaves the real account alone; PIN guessing is throttled
(5 misses, then 30 s doubling up to 15 min); the duress blob shares the salt
so unlock time does not reveal which PIN was entered; iOS keychain items are
this-device only; biometrics are biometric-only; screen security defaults
to on and is applied after unlock; tapjacking filter in MainActivity.
Tests: content types, shared-salt unwrap, duress isolation.
2026-10-09 14:02:33 +02:00
Julius Joska 92eb316a83 tests: make design-rationale comments self-contained
Test comments referenced internal design documents that are not part
of this repository. The relevant invariants are now stated inline.
2026-07-11 20:02:56 +02:00
Julius Joska 8081d98c67 Šepot — end-to-end encrypted messenger
Initial public release. Anonymous on-device identity (no phone number,
e-mail, or password), Signal-protocol cryptography (X3DH + PQXDH, Double
Ratchet, sealed sender) via libsignal, a metadata-minimizing relay,
group chats, disappearing messages, encrypted local storage, optional
Tor transport, and a UI localized into Czech, English, German, Russian,
and Italian.

Monorepo: Flutter client (app/), Rust relay + wire types (rust/),
protobuf definitions (proto/), self-host deploy (deploy/).

Licensed under AGPL-3.0 with an app-store distribution exception (§7).
2026-07-11 17:21:47 +02:00