# Šepot **Šepot** is an end-to-end encrypted messenger with anonymous, on-device identity. There is no phone number, e-mail, or password: an account is a keypair generated on the device, your ID is the fingerprint of your public key, and the only backup is a mnemonic phrase. The design goal is **metadata minimization with a public threat model** — never "zero metadata". The relay is deliberately dumb: it cannot read message content, does not learn who sent a message, and does not log IP addresses. What it *does* see is documented honestly below. > Status: pre-1.0. The Android client is the primary target; iOS builds run through TestFlight. See [`CHANGELOG.md`](CHANGELOG.md). ## Features - **Signal-grade cryptography** via the official Rust `libsignal`: X3DH + post-quantum PQXDH (Kyber-1024) key agreement, Double Ratchet, and sealed sender. - **Anonymous identity** — no phone/e-mail/password. Recovery through a 24-word mnemonic that encodes the identity key itself (not a KDF seed). - **Encrypted at rest** — all local data lives in SQLCipher, unlocked by a PIN (Argon2id-derived key) or biometrics. Optional **duress PIN** opens a separate empty database. - **Group chats** — up to 128 members, pairwise fan-out so every member gets full forward secrecy; the relay never learns a group exists. - **Attachments** — images and files are encrypted client-side (AES-256-GCM) and uploaded as opaque blobs with a TTL; image metadata (EXIF/GPS) is stripped on send. - **Disappearing messages**, read receipts (off by default), voice messages, replies, reactions, edits, contact verification (safety numbers). - **Push without Google by default** — UnifiedPush/ntfy; FCM (Android) and APNs (iOS) are opt-in. A push wake-up never carries content, sender, or count. - **Tor transport** (Android, via Orbot) — routes relay traffic over a `.onion` to hide the client IP. Off by default. - **Five languages** — Czech, English, German, Russian, Italian. The UI follows the system language and can be overridden in Settings. ## How it works ``` ┌────────────┐ sealed-sender ciphertext ┌──────────────┐ │ Šepot app │ ───────(WSS or Tor)─────────▶ │ relay │ ──▶ PostgreSQL │ (Flutter) │ ◀────── wake push ─────────── │ (Rust/axum) │ (no content, └────────────┘ └──────────────┘ no IP, no PII) libsignal (FFI) offline queue, TTL SQLCipher at rest opaque attachment blobs ``` Every message is encrypted end-to-end with libsignal and wrapped in a sealed-sender envelope, so the relay routes by recipient delivery address without learning the sender. Undelivered messages sit in a per-recipient queue with a fixed TTL and are hard-deleted on acknowledgement. **What the relay can see:** the recipient's delivery address, message size, and timing. **What it cannot see:** message content, the sender's identity, group membership, or (with logging disabled as shipped) client IP addresses. The full model — including where the trust boundary sits — is in [`THIRD-PARTY-NOTICES.md`](THIRD-PARTY-NOTICES.md) and the crypto facade `app/lib/core/crypto/`. ## Repository layout | Path | Contents | |---|---| | `app/` | Flutter client (Android, iOS; desktop scaffolding present) | | `rust/` | Cargo workspace — `sepot-relay` (relay server), `sepot-proto` (prost wire types) | | `proto/` | Protobuf wire definitions — single source for both Rust and Dart | | `deploy/` | Docker Compose for self-hosting the relay (with an optional Tor onion) | | `tool/` | Helper scripts (protobuf codegen for Dart) | ## Building ### Client (Android) ```bash cd app flutter pub get flutter build apk --release ``` The native `libsignal` binary is fetched by the Flutter native-assets hook at build time. To point a dev build at your own relay: ```bash flutter build apk --dart-define=SEPOT_RELAY=http://:8470 ``` Release signing reads `app/android/key.properties` (kept out of the repo); without it the build falls back to the debug signing config so `flutter run` still works. FCM is optional — the `google-services` plugin is only applied if you supply your own `app/android/app/google-services.json` (copy `google-services.json.example`). Without it the app runs on UnifiedPush. ### Relay (self-host) See [`deploy/relay/README.md`](deploy/relay/README.md). The relay is a single Rust binary plus PostgreSQL; put a TLS-terminating reverse proxy in front of it and, optionally, expose it as a Tor onion service. ## Languages UI strings live in `app/lib/l10n/app_*.arb` (`cs`, `en`, `de`, `ru`, `it`) and are compiled by Flutter's `gen-l10n`. Contributions of new translations are welcome — add an `app_.arb`, translate the keys from `app_cs.arb`, and run `flutter gen-l10n`. ## Security Cryptography is implemented by Signal's `libsignal`, not by hand-rolled primitives. If you find a vulnerability, please report it privately to **bezpecnost@sepot.cz** rather than opening a public issue. ## License Šepot is licensed under the **GNU Affero General Public License v3.0** — see [`LICENSE`](LICENSE). The license includes an **AGPL §7 additional permission for app-store distribution**: Šepot may be distributed through App Store / Google Play provided the complete corresponding source stays available under the AGPL through a channel *without* those store restrictions (this repository, F-Droid, direct APK). That permission covers only Šepot's own code. The bundled Signal `libsignal` is AGPL-3.0 held by Signal Messenger, LLC — its app-store status is documented in [`THIRD-PARTY-NOTICES.md`](THIRD-PARTY-NOTICES.md).